

# ICSOC 2006 - Chicago, IL


## **A Priori Conformance Verification for Guaranteeing Interoperability in Open Environments**

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
# Web Services

- Web services are heterogeneous devices that can be *invoked* over the web
- Executable description of their business process (especially the interactive behavior)
- Tasks: composition, selection, ...
- *Dynamic dimension* due to the openness of the web




# WS interoperability

- How to guarantee the *interoperability* of a dynamically composed set of WS?
- Interoperability is the capability of a peer of *interacting* with others
- This means they will actually produce a *successful* “conversation” (sequence of message invocation)




# WS interoperability

- Verification of the properties of the interactions among a set of processes: widely studied in the literature
- The web adds for Web Services a **dynamic feature**: the set of available processes evolves in time, they can be **reused**, they can be **assembled** dynamically and they are, in principle, unknown to each other




# The summer school example

- In open environments services are identified and composed on demand:
  - retrieval done component by component
  - components behaviour could be private, not accessible for inspection





# Choreographies and protocols: public specifications

- Need for a “distributed” verification of interoperability
- Define and make public the set of interaction rules that the group should follow (***protocol or choreography***), eg. by means of a standardized language such as WS-CDL




# A-priori interoperability verification

- To perform the conformance test against the role specification
  - “*a-priori*”  
*interoperability test*
  - *static interoperability checking*
- *Verify-once run-always*



# The summer school example


- *Desire*: to check interoperability **without any knowledge of the services that will play other roles**
- *Solution*: **a-priori verification** of interoperability






# Conformance test w.r.t. a protocol

- A service can enter the society only if its interactive behavior **conforms** to the communication protocol
- *The **conformance test w.r.t. a protocol** guarantees a-priori the interoperability and that the generated conversations will be “legal” w.r.t. the protocol*




# Reusing components: the coffee break example

- Existing components *might slightly differ* from the specification ...
- ... but *when interacting* they could anyway behave as desired
- Conformance “*at design time*” is *too strong* to allow them to be chosen




# Conformance test w.r.t. a role specification

- (b) and (c) do not compromise the interoperability
- A conformant policy ***never utters speech acts that are not expected***, according to the protocol, and it should be able to ***handle any message that can possibly be received***, according to the protocol
- $\Rightarrow$  ***It is not conformance w.r.t. design***




# Message invocation paradigm

- Similarity with method invocation over objects
  - An object must necessarily be able to handle messages sent by other objects in the context of its public interface
  - An object is not obliged to use all methods offered in the public interface
  - An object can have more methods than the interface requires




# Conformance test is not an inclusion test

- Protocols and conversation policies represented as *FSA*
- *Conformance test*: could not be a simple inclusion test based on the set of possible execution traces [CLIMA VI, WS-FM 05]



# Conformance test is not a bisimulation test




- The role description and the policy allow ***the same conversations but the structure differs***
- Only (b) and (c) compromise the interoperability
- *(bi)simulation is too strong: all cases are not bisimilar*
- Bisimulation in [Busi et al. 05, Zhao et al. 06], execution traces [Foster et al. 06, Alberti et al. 06]

# Action and Re-Action

- An outgoing message is interpreted *an action* while an incoming message is interpreted as *a re-action*
- Sending a message implies a decision to perform an action while receiving a message does not
- Sending a message means *to request for an execution of a task* while receiving a message means *executing a task*
- *Asymmetric behaviour* w.r.t. the standard interpretation for sending and receiveing messages in process algebra and (bi)simulation techniques

# Conformant simulation


- ***Our proposal:*** an *asymmetric simulation* for dealing with outgoing and incoming messages in a different way






# Conformant simulation

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
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# Conformant simulation

- ***Our proposal:*** an *asymmetric simulation* for dealing with outgoing and incoming messages in a different way
- ***Conformance simulation***

*Given two FSA's  $A_1$  and  $A_2$ .  $A_1$  is conformant simulation of  $A_2$ ,*

*$A_1 \leq A_2$  iff there is a binary relation  $R$  between  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  such that*

- *$A_1.s_0 R A_2.s_0$*
- *for every outgoing message  $m!$  in  $A_1.L$  and for every state  $s_i$  in  $A_1.S$ , for every  $s_j$  in  $A_2.S$  s.t.  $s_i R s_j$  and  $(s_i, m!, s_{i+1})$  in  $A_1.T$ , then there is a state  $s_{j+1}$  in  $A_2.S$  s.t.  $(s_j, m!, s_{j+1})$  in  $A_2.T$  and  $s_{i+1} R s_{j+1}$*
- *for every incoming message  $m?$  in  $A_2.L$  and for every state  $s_j$  in  $A_2.S$ , for every  $s_i$  in  $A_1.S$  s.t.  $s_i R s_j$  and  $(s_j, m?, s_{j+1})$  in  $A_2.T$ , then there is a state  $s_{i+1}$  in  $A_1.S$  s.t.  $(s_i, m!, s_{i+1})$  in  $A_1.T$  and  $s_{i+1} R s_{j+1}$*

# Conformant simulation

**“ $A_1 \leq A_2$ ” does not entail “ $L(A_1) \subseteq L(A_2)$ ”**

- However, with “ $A_1 \leq A_2$ ” we capture the fact that  $A_1$  will actually produce *a subset of the conversations foreseen by the role, when interacting with entities that play the other roles in the protocol*
- **Proposition**  
Let  $A_1 \otimes \dots \otimes A_n$  be a protocol, and let  $A_1', \dots, A_n'$  be  $n$  policies s.t.  $A_i' \leq A_i$ , for  $i=1, \dots, n$ , then  
$$A_1' \otimes \dots \otimes A_n' \subseteq A_1 \otimes \dots \otimes A_n$$

# Complete conformance simulation

- We assume that in a protocol it is always possible to conclude a conversation whatever the point at which the interaction arrived. We expect a similar property to hold also for a set of conformant policies

**Definition 8 (Complete conformant simulation).** *Given two FSA's  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  we say that  $A_1$  is a complete conformant simulation of  $A_2$ , written  $A_1 \trianglelefteq A_2$ , iff there is a  $A_1$  is a conformant simulation of  $A_2$  under a binary relation  $\mathcal{R}$  and*

- *for all  $s_i \in A_1.F$  such that  $s_i \mathcal{R} s_j$ , then  $s_j \in A_2.F$ ;*
- *for all  $s_j \in A_2.S$  such that  $s_j$  is alive and  $s_i \mathcal{R} s_j$ ,  $s_i \in A_1.S$ , then  $s_i$  is alive.*

**Theorem 1 (Interoperability).** *Let  $A_1 \otimes \dots \otimes A_n$  be a protocol and let  $A'_1, \dots, A'_n$  be  $n$  policies such that  $A'_i \trianglelefteq A_i$ , for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . For any common string  $\overline{\sigma'}$  of  $A'_1 \otimes \dots \otimes A'_n$  and  $A_1 \otimes \dots \otimes A_n$  there is a run  $\sigma' \sigma''$  such that  $\overline{\sigma' \sigma''}$  is an accepted string of  $A'_1 \otimes \dots \otimes A'_n$ . **They will be able to conclude their interaction producing a legal accepted run***

# Conclusions and future work

- We face the problem of verifying the interoperability of a set of peers by exploiting an abstract description of the desired interaction: *static interoperability checking*
- Connections to standards like WS-CDL and BPEL
- A calculus for the “a-priori” interoperability test
- Can an agent/peer, having its own strategies, profitably take part to a “game”? In other words, does an agent/peer have the capabilities that allow it ***to reach its own goal by playing a given role?***  
[PPSWR 06, SOT-WEB 06]

# Conformant simulation

**Definition 1 (Finite State Automaton).** *A finite state automaton is a tuple  $(S, s_0, L, T, F)$ , where  $S$  is a finite set of states,  $s_0 \in S$  is a distinguished initial state,  $L$  is a finite set of labels,  $T \subseteq (S \times L \times S)$  is a set of transitions,  $F \subseteq S$  is a set of final states.*

**Definition 2 (Runs and strings).** *A run  $\sigma$  of a FSA  $(S, s_0, L, T, F)$  is an ordered, possibly infinite, set of transitions (a sequence)  $(s_0, l_0, s_1), (s_1, l_1, s_2), (s_2, l_2, s_3), \dots$  such that  $\forall i \geq 0, (s_i, l_i, s_{i+1}) \in T$ , while the sequence  $l_0 l_1 \dots$  is the corresponding string  $\bar{\sigma}$ .*

**Definition 3 (Acceptance).** *An accepting run of a finite state automaton  $(S, s_0, L, T, F)$  is a finite run  $\sigma$  in which the final transition  $(s_{n-1}, l_{n-1}, s_n)$  has the property that  $s_n \in F$ . The corresponding string  $\bar{\sigma}$  is an accepted string.*



# Conformant simulation


**Definition 4 (Free product).** Let  $A_i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , be  $n$  FSA's. The free product  $A_1 \times \dots \times A_n$  is the FSA  $A = (S, s_0, L, T, F)$  defined by:

- $S$  is the set  $A_1.S \times \dots \times A_n.S$ ;
- $s_0$  is the tuple  $(A_1.s_0, \dots, A_n.s_0)$ ;
- $L$  is the set  $A_1.L \times \dots \times A_n.L$ ;
- $T$  is the set of tuples  $((A_1.s_1, \dots, A_n.s_n), (l_1, \dots, l_n), (A_1.s'_1, \dots, A_n.s'_n))$  such that  $(A_i.s_i, l_i, A_i.s'_i) \in A_i.T$ , for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ ; and
- $F$  is the set of tuples  $(A_1.s_1, \dots, A_n.s_n) \in A.S$  such that  $s_i \in A_i.F$ , for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ .

**Definition 5 (Synchronous product).** Let  $A_i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , be  $n$  FSA's. The synchronous product of the  $A_i$ 's, written  $A_1 \otimes \dots \otimes A_n$ , is the FSA obtained as the free product of the  $A_i$ 's containing only the transitions  $((A_1.s_1, \dots, A_n.s_n), (l_1, \dots, l_n), (A_1.s'_1, \dots, A_n.s'_n))$  such that there exist  $i$  and  $j$ ,  $1 \leq i \neq j \leq n$ ,  $l_i = m!$ ,  $l_j = m?$ , and for any  $k$  not equal to  $i$  and  $j$ ,  $l_k = \varepsilon$ .


# WS orchestration and choreography

- **Choreography**: global point of view/abstract protocol, eg. *WS-CDL language*
- **Behavioral interface**: local point of view/policy, eg. *BPEL abstract process*
- **Orchestration**: describes both communicative and non-communicative behavior allowing execution, eg. *BPEL executable processes*



# Conformance in interaction protocols engineering

- To check if a policy (protocol subjective implementation) verifies the AUML specification, the FSM specification, the Social Commitments specification, etc.
- It is analogous to the validation phase but it concerns the program and not the formal description
- *Automatic synthesis* [Zavattaro et al., van der Aalst et al.]



# Conformance test: *our expectations*

- Any message that can be sent, at any point of the execution, will be handled by one of its interlocutors
- Whatever point of conversation has been reached, there is a way to bring it to the end
- A conversation is *legal w.r.t. a protocol* if it respects the specifications given by the protocol (it is an execution trace allowed by the protocol)

